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ROLE OVER PERSON:
LEGITIMACY AND AUTHENTICITY IN TEACHING

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Abstract

This paper discusses competing norms for justifying teacher decisions, their effects on productivity and legitimacy in teaching, and the teaching profession as a moral and learning community. Drawing on philosophical analyses and studies of elementary and secondary schools, teacher preparation, staff development, and the adoption of innovations, it argues that personal orientations (centering on personal habits, interests, and opinions) remove teacher decisions from the realm of criteria for judging appropriateness. Personal reasons have explanatory value; they carry less weight when justifying professional action. Role orientation involves references to larger, organized contexts, including the disciplines of knowledge, group purposes, and societal issues. Attention to the teaching role is particularly important in American education where structural features (e.g., recruitment, induction, rewards) and the ethos of the profession converge in presentism, conservatism, and individualism. These tendencies are reinforced by typical workplace conditions. Teacher isolation and the lack of shared experiences and a common language make it difficult to develop role orientation. Practices in teacher preparation and staff development stressing the personal, even idiosyncratic, element in teaching are therefore problematic and ought to be abandoned. Instead, teacher educators should attempt to develop and support role orientation as a disposition.
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Choice in Teaching

What teachers do is neither natural nor necessary but based on choice. Since choice may harden into custom or dissipate into whim, one asks for justification; it is a way of assuring that teaching will periodically pass muster. In justifying their actions, people give reasons. For teachers, personal reasons can be appropriate when understanding a given action is at issue, but they carry less weight in considering the wisdom of an action or decision. In other words, some contexts call for justification and others for explanation. When one wants to understand why someone did something, one wants to know what actually motivated him or her. But if one wants to know whether what was done was right, one wants to hear and assess justifications. Here it is important that the reasons be good reasons, and it becomes less important whether they were operating at the time.

The question, then, is what counts as good reasons in teaching. I argue that for many teacher actions, personal reasons are subordinate to external standards and that the scope of these actions is much broader than people often assume. Providing acceptable justifications requires community to both

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2Margret Buchmann coordinates the IRT's Conceptual Analytic Project. She is an associate professor of teacher education at Michigan State University. She wishes to acknowledge and thank Robert Floden and John Schwille who made valuable comments on drafts of this paper.
set standards for adequacy and to determine a set of rules for guidance. The role obligations of teachers hence forge bonds, not only ensuring compliance but generating effort and involvement.

Curriculum decisions may be at the top of the list of teacher actions for which one should expect adequate justifications, for it is not a matter of indifference or whim just what the educator chooses to teach. Some selections we judge better than others; some we deem positively intolerable. Nor are we content to discuss issues of selection as if they hinged on personal taste alone. We try to convince others; we present ordered arguments; we appeal to custom and principle; we point to relevant consequences and implicit commitments. In short, we consider decisions on educational content to be responsible or justifiable acts with public significance. (Scheffler, 1977, p. 497)

But decisions about the social organization of the class, how to deal with parents, and how to treat requests (or directives) from school administrators are also examples of teacher actions that are responsible acts of public significance. It is useful to recall the root meaning of responsibility; being a respondent has to do with one's answering for things and defending a position.

Personal reasons--centering on one's habits, interests, and opinions--are relevant for considering the wisdom of actions where the question is what the individual wants to accomplish, but not for situations where goals (and perhaps a range of means) are given. People accepting a professional role are in the latter situation, and one must ask whether their particular actions and general dispositions are enacting and conforming to given goals. Such people have no right to decide whether to act on their clients' behalf and in their interests: teaching school, putting a leg in a cast, or appearing in a court of law. This is why a professional's most significant choice is whether to take on the role (Fried, 1978). The Aristotelian view that the person "of
practical wisdom exemplifies an ideal; he in no way originates, questions or modifies that ideal" (Schwartz, 1979, p. 97) applies to teaching.

What is close to people is always important to them; the personal will take care of itself. But professional aspirations, responsibility, and curricular subjects with their pedagogies must be learned. Tendencies in teacher preparation and staff development to stress individualism, self-realization, and the personal—even idiosyncratic—element in teaching are therefore problematic. This would be true in any case. But such tendencies are extremely questionable in American education, where structural features (e.g., recruitment, induction, rewards) and the ethos of the profession already converge in conservatism, presentism, and individualism. The point is that attention to role is especially important for American teachers because it goes against many potent forces.

An understanding of teacher orientations (role versus personal) and their effects is particularly important now when there is a strong press to set policies that will improve schooling in the United States. It is well recognized that teachers often play the role of street-level bureaucrats and have the final word on exactly what will be done in the classroom and what the actual curriculum will be (for a review, see Brophy, 1982). This implies that making good policy requires knowing how teachers are likely to act in answer to policy initiatives and why (Wise, 1979). It requires, furthermore, thinking about those competencies and dispositions that teachers should have (Kerr, 1983; Sykes, 1983).

Teaching As a Role

It is crucial to appreciate the fact that "teacher" is a role word. Roles embody some of our highest aspirations and provide social mechanisms for
shaping action in their light. They are parts people play in society and do not describe individuals. Teacher obligations—that behaviors and dispositions that students and the public have a right to expect of teachers—actually have three important aspects that have no personal reference or connection. First, these obligations do not depend on any particular individuals (teachers or students). Second, they apply regardless of personal opinions, likes, or dislikes. Third, they relate to what is taught and learned. In schools, teachers are supposed to help students participate in "the community of subject matter" (Hawkins, 1974). These objective contents of thought and experience—systems, theories, ideas—are impersonal because they are distinct from the people who learn or discuss them; they are, to some extent, independent of time and place (Polanyi, 1962).

In an immediate sense, teachers have obligations toward the body of their students; these obligations center on helping them learn worthwhile things in the social context of classrooms and schools. The view of students as learners underlies the distinctive obligations of teachers; and role orientation in teaching by definition means taking an interest in student learning. Thus, insofar as teachers are not social workers, career counselors, or simply adults who care for children, their work centers on the curriculum and presupposes subject matter knowledge. This does not exclude their caring about children or being a person in their role. But, though teachers who never explain or demonstrate anything, who neither answer questions nor question answers, may be engaged in some useful activity, they do not teach (Buchmann, 1984).

Role words also indicate obligations toward more remote communities; in teaching, these communities include the profession, the public, and the
disciplines of knowledge. For instance, while it is important to communicate the fact that disciplinary knowledge is not absolute, teachers have to recognize and respect the constraints imposed by the structure of different disciplines on their decisions about how to teach, for:

If a structure of teaching and learning is alien to the structure of what we propose to teach, the outcome will inevitably be a corruption of that content. (Schwab, 1978, p. 242)

Since teachers are supposed to look after the educational interests of children, they have to learn to live with the fact that they are not free to choose methods, content, or classroom organization for psychological, social, or personal reasons alone.

The teacher educator slogans of "finding the technique that works for you," "discovering your own beliefs," "no one right way to teach," and "being creative and unique" (see, e.g., Combs, 1967; Goodman, 1984) are seductive half-truths. They are seductive because anyone likes to be told that being oneself and doing one's own thing is alright, even laudable. Conduct sanctioned in this fashion—while consistent with professional discipline for those who already have the necessary dispositions and competencies—allows for both minimal effort and idiosyncrasy in other cases. These slogans are half-truth because—although identifying teachers' personal and commonsense beliefs is important—once identified, these beliefs must be appraised as bases and guides for professional conduct and, where necessary, changed.

Professional socialization marks a turning point in the perception of relevant others and of oneself, yet a reversal of prior conceptions is less clear cut and typical in teaching than in other professions (Lortie, 1975). Formal socializing mechanisms in teaching are few and short in duration, not very arduous, and have weak effects. The lengthy, personal experience of
schooling, however, provides a repertoire of behaviors and beliefs that teachers draw on. Where it is successful, professional socialization trains attention on the specialized claims that others have on one. Thus the teaching role entails a specific and difficult shift of concern from self to others for which the "apprenticeship of observation" (Lortie, 1975) provides no training; Hight (1966) describes the nature of this shift:

You must think, not what you know, but what they do not know; not what you find hard, but what they will find hard; then, after putting yourself inside their minds, obstinate or puzzled, groping or mistaken as they are, explain what they need to learn. (p. 280)

In general, a shift of concern from self to others comes more from acknowledging, "This is the kind of work I am doing," than from stating, "This is how I feel," or "This is how I do things." Subjective reasons refer to personal characteristics and preferences. They are permissive rather than stringent, variable rather than uniform. Appraisal requires distance, but detachment is difficult where things are simply seen as part of oneself. A danger is that personal beliefs and preferences are "no longer easily accessible to reflection, criticism, modification, or expulsion" (Schwab, 1976b, p. 37). This explains the air of finality that many subjective reasons have. Yet it is not that personal beliefs and preferences must necessarily be misleading or selfish, but that—where such criteria rule—other and more legitimate concerns may become secondary (Lortie, 1975). This reverses the relation in which personal and professional reasons should stand in teaching.

Subjectivity And Reasonableness

When people say, "This is the kind of person I am," they mean to close an issue and put an end to debate, whether the issues have been satisfactorily resolved or not. An emphasis on the self can block the flow of speculation,
conversation, and reflection by which people shape habits of action and mind that affect others or the self; it means cutting oneself and the collective off from some of the most valuable human resources. Imperviousness and finality—of feeling, belief, or habit—interfere with learning and with getting better at helping others learn.

Justification is always tied to reason and susceptibility to reason, teaching is special in the sorts of reasons that are acceptable. Professional decisions are tied to the public realm where they are constrained by facts and norms, both forms of public knowledge. Put differently, justification needs to reach beyond the particulars of teachers' own actions and inclinations to consider larger, organized contexts relevant to their work, such as the disciplines of knowledge, laws, and societal issues (Thelen, 1973). And teachers need not be creative to be reasonable. Rather, they must be willing to act in accordance with rules, submit to impersonal judgment, and be open to change for good reasons. To call an action or person reasonable still is praise, for reasonable people are neither inconsiderate nor rash, and their actions are unlikely to be futile or foolish (Black, 1972).

Caprice and habit cut teaching off from thought, particularly from its moral roots. In cause and origin, caprice is inherently self-contained; it contrasts with cultivation or improvement by education, training, or attentive labor. Habit is the opposite of impulse, and it confines in a different way. Yet caprice and habit are alike in that they both allow for action without adequate reason, removing teacher actions and decisions from the realm of criteria for judging appropriateness. Part of reasonableness is the habit and capacity of giving due weight to evidence and the arguments of others who may offer new data or alternative explanations.
The outcomes of teaching matter and feedback from data is rarely clear. But teachers living by action alone may never ask what is happening, and therefore cannot improve upon opportunity. Nor are teachers exceptions to the rule that not everything people want is good. Hence it can be argued that—even more important than current effectiveness—is the degree to which teachers are susceptible to data and ideas of objective standing based on student behavior, the advice of colleagues, teacher educators and researchers, the evolving standards of the field, and policy recommendations.

Workplace Isolation and Role Orientation

Teaching is lonely work in the United States. Controls are weak and standards low, rewards uncertainly related to achievement, and work success uncertain, often elusive (Lortie, 1975). While an inner transformation from person to teacher may be wanting, one can still get a job teaching school. There is a sense of "easy come, easy go" in teaching; such transiency does not support a sense of community. Tenure and salary are based on years of service rather than competence or commitment. An active interest in student learning does not come with teaching experience, as some teacher development theories seem to suggest (see e.g., Fuller, 1969). To the contrary, teaching seems to have a calcifying effect on teachers (McLaughlin & Marsh, 1978; Waller, 1932/1961). The teaching career is flat, not providing sufficient opportunities for changes in responsibilities and professional renewal. Together with the uncertainties of teaching, this can affect even dedicated teachers. Thus Sizer (1984) describes the feelings of Horace, a veteran teacher of 28 years:

He is so familiar with the mistakes that ninth-graders make that he can sense them coming even before their utterance. Adverbs are always tougher to teach than adjectives. What frustrates him most
are the partly correct answers; Horace worries that if he signals that a reply is somewhat accurate, all the students will think it is entirely accurate. At the same time, if he takes some minutes to sort out the truth from the falsity, the entire train of thought will be lost. He can never pursue any one student's errors to completion without losing all the others. (p. 13)

The organization of public schooling in America isolates teachers from one another, and there is a lack of a common language and shared experiences. Hence it is difficult to develop role orientation that one would be able and willing to use in justification. And what does the "inner self" do that is left unwatched and deprived of rules of conduct based on external standards and role-specific sanctions? The degree to which one's behavior can be observed and one's beliefs examined by relevant others is crucial in role performance and professional discipline. On the one hand, "If all the facts of one's conduct and beliefs were freely available to anyone, social structures could not operate" (Merton, 1957, p. 115). However, insulation can lead people astray, for "the teacher or physician who is largely insulated from observability may fail to live up to the requirements of his status" (Merton, 1957, p. 115). Where social structure insulates individuals, they are also less likely to be subject to conflicting pressures--simply because what they do is less well known.

With increasing size and a continuing accumulation of formal policies, schools are becoming public-service bureaucracies. Teachers adapt to conflicting policies and endemic uncertainties as best they can. These adaptations can result in private, intensely held redefinitions of the nature of teaching and of the clientele. In resolving the tension between capabilities (often constrained by work-place demands) and objectives, individuals may lower their goals or withdraw from attempts at reaching them altogether. In responding to a diverse clientele, they may reject the norm of
universalism and discount some groups as unteachable. Because these personal conceptions help individual professionals placed in difficult situations, they tend to be held rigidly and are not open to discussion. Also, though modifying one’s conception of students is private, the content of typical coping responses is likely to reflect prevailing biases (Lipsky, 1980). There is thus a troubling relation between the development and persistence of inappropriate coping strategies in teaching—including racial, cultural, and sexual stereotypes—and the relative likelihood of staying on the job.

Role orientation as a disposition can steady teachers in their separate classrooms, calling to mind what their work is about and who is to benefit from it. A disposition is a special kind of orientation. While "to orient oneself" means to bring oneself into defined relations to known facts or principles, a disposition is a bent of mind that, once it is in place, comes naturally. Dispositions are inclinations relating to the social and moral qualities of one's actions; they are not just habits but intelligent capacities (Scheffler, 1965). With role orientation as a disposition, no extraordinary resolve is necessary to occasionally take a hard look at what one does or believes in teaching. But instead of instilling role orientation as a disposition, teacher educators often focus on the personal concerns of novices and experienced teachers.

Personal Concerns and Teacher Learning

In examining the process of learning to teach, teacher development, and the adoption of innovations in schools, researchers and educators have identified a shift from personal to "impact" concerns (how is my action or innovation affecting my students?) as crucial. Among the teachers, for
instance, who do not use innovations are those most concerned with the implications of change for themselves personally (Hall & George, 1978). Fuller (1969) sees the emergence of concern for student learning as a culminating point in teacher development.

Yet recently, Fuller’s concept of personalized teacher education has been questioned, even as an approach that may lead teachers from self-oriented concerns to other-oriented concerns (Feiman & Floden, 1980). The assumption, for instance, that earlier concerns must be resolved before later ones can emerge confuses readiness and motivation. Just because some concerns carry more personal and affective charge, it does not follow that other concerns—less immediate, more important—cannot be thought about. These criticisms also apply to the work of Hall and his associates (e.g., Hall, Loucks, Rutherford & Newlove, 1975; Hall & Loucks, 1978), who base the content of interventions in staff development on teachers’ concerns. Actually, teacher preparation and staff development that focus on personal concerns may have the undesirable effect of communicating to teachers that their own comfort is the most important goal of teacher education.

Zeichner and Teitelbaum (1982) draw attention to the political attitudes that a personalized, concerns-based approach to teacher preparation may promote.

By advocating the postponement of complex educational questions to a point beyond preservice training and by focusing attention primarily on meeting the survival-oriented and technical concerns of student teachers, this approach (while it may make students more comfortable) serves to promote uncritical acceptance of existing distributions of power and resources. (p. 101)

One form of conservatism is to take the given and rest—an attitude that bypasses an important source of learning and change, namely, to take the given and ask. An emphasis on personal concerns is unlikely to change the ethos of
individualism, conservatism, and presentism in teaching. There is, moreover, recent empirical evidence that both elementary and secondary teachers base significant curricular decisions on personal preferences. This is empirical backing for my claim that role orientation is not getting sufficient emphasis in education.

Teacher Preferences and the Curriculum

At the elementary level, Schmidt and Buchmann (1983) show that the allocation of time to subjects in six elementary classrooms was associated with teachers' personal beliefs and feelings concerning reading, language arts, mathematics, science, and social studies. Briefly, average daily time allocations went up and down in accordance with (1) teacher judgments on the degree of emphasis subjects should receive and (2) indications (self-reports) of the extent to which teachers enjoyed teaching these curricular areas. When projected over the entire school year, differences in time allocations associated with teacher preferences amounted to significant differences in the curriculum, for example 45 hours more or less of mathematics instruction, 70 of social studies, and 100 of science.

Researchers also asked teachers to indicate how difficult they found teaching the five areas of the elementary school curriculum. Findings here were mixed and thought-provoking. For instance, in the area of reading, the six teachers studied did not seem to spend less time on reading just because they found it difficult to teach. But some such tendency could be observed in language arts, social studies, mathematics, and science. However, even here the results were less than clear. The mean differences between the teachers who found it difficult to teach social studies or mathematics and who found either subject easy to teach, for example, were small. It is possible that
personal difficulties experienced in teaching a subject may to some extent be neutralized by external policies or a sense of what is an appropriate emphasis on a particular subject. Also, these unclear results may be due to the fact that "finding something difficult to teach" has two alternative senses, (1) the difficulty for children of the subject, and (2) the difficulty of the subject for the teacher.  

In a related exploratory interview study (Buchmann, 1983), 11 out of 20 elementary teachers showed some form of role orientation as they explained the ways they typically organized curricular subjects in their classrooms (integrated versus non-integrated). What united the responses of role-oriented teachers was the fact that they placed themselves within a larger picture in which colleagues, the curriculum, and accountability figured in some fashion. They looked outward rather than inward. This is not to say that they had no personal interests or preferences that influenced what they taught and how they taught it. But they felt bound by obligations; the personal element in their responses was framed by a sense of the collective.

Teachers demonstrating a personal orientation in their responses did not go beyond the context of their own activities. Most of them (six out of nine) explained their classroom practices by reference to themselves as persons. Their responses tended toward the proximate: Affinity to self, immediate experience, the present characteristics of children. The "language of caprice" (Lortie, 1975, p. 212) pervaded several of their responses. In cases where they recognized that the needs of some children were unlikely to be met by their approach to teaching, these teachers would still explain what they

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3This idea was suggested to me by Joseph J. Schwab.
thought and did by reference to personal inclination or habitual ways of working.

A three-year study of 14 fifth-grade classrooms examining curriculum and learning in science (Smith & Anderson, 1984), concluded that teachers' reliance on personal beliefs and teaching styles hindered student learning. For example, in using a text with an unusual and sophisticated teaching strategy, teachers did not pay attention to critical information provided in the teachers' guide, depending on their previous ideas instead. In general, the researchers distinguished three approaches to teaching science that they identified by observing how teachers used textbooks and materials.

Activity-driven teachers focused on management and student interests rather than student learning; while following the teacher's guide rather closely, they omitted or curtailed class discussions meant to help students think about the science activities they were doing. Didactic teachers stayed even closer to the text, which they regarded as a repository of the knowledge to be taught; their presentations, however, made little room for children's expression of their naive scientific conceptions, which therefore remained largely unchallenged. By contrast, discovery-oriented teachers avoided giving answers and encouraged students to develop their own ideas from the results of experiments; yet this distorted crucial intents of the text, which required direct instruction at certain points. While the texts were not perfect (failing, for instance, to spell out assumptions about teaching and learning science in the teacher's guide), the fact remains that these teachers relied on their personal approach to science teaching, with the result that the curriculum miscarried.
Cusick (1982) studied two large secondary schools, one predominately white and suburban, the other racially mixed and located in the central part of a smaller industrial region. Though there were exceptions (for instance, a grammar teacher in whose classes teaching and learning this unlikely subject happened as a matter of course), a self-oriented and laissez-faire approach to curriculum and student learning was typical in both schools. An American history class with a teacher who had served in World War II became a class on that European war; in a class on speech and forensics the teacher encouraged students (mostly black) to talk about the seamier side of their personal lives—with no one listening, or teaching about speaking. A premium was put on "getting along with kids," and this reward structure combined with isolation from colleagues, lack of scrutiny, and an open elective system turned these schools into places where teachers and students did what felt comfortable or what allowed them to get by. Though there was a pattern to these adaptations, they happened privately. These schools were not normative communities.

Cusick concludes that the secondary teachers he studied constructed "egocentric fields": They treated their job as an extension of self. The presumed needs of students accounted for most justifications of teaching practice ("this is the way to teach these kids," "this is what they relate to," or "I'm getting them ready for life"). However, curriculum and student needs were never discussed among teachers in these schools. This raises at least two important problems. First, though the freedom teachers enjoyed may bring high effort in some, other teachers can get by with doing little. Second, while able students with adult guidance may still learn worthwhile things under such conditions, others will pass through high school without
learning much of anything.

In Teaching, Self-Realization Is Moral

Autonomy and self-realization are indisputably personal goods. Schools, however, are for children, and children's autonomy and self-realization depend in part on what they learn in schools. Thus self-realization in teaching is not a good in itself, but only insofar as pursuing self-realization leads to more student learning. The point is that in professional work reasons of personal preference usually will not do; this applies to nursing, soldiering, and managing a stock portfolio. The idea of a surgeon keen on self-realization at the operating table is macabre. A nurse who brings up personality and preference in explaining why he changed standard procedures in dealing with a seizure would not get very far. There is no reason why such things should be more acceptable in teaching. The fact that we may have come to accept them is certainly no justification.

Everyone likes to be comfortable, free of pain and bother. But the perspectives of psychology and profession are not the same. Things charged with personal meaning may lead nowhere in teaching. Even the integrity of self depends in part on suspending impulse. Simply declaring "where one comes from" makes justified action a matter of taste and preference, which expresses and reinforces a massive moral confusion (MacIntyre, 1984; Shklar, 1984). In general, conscience does not reduce to sincerity:

While the "heart may have reasons of its own," when it simply chooses to assert these without critical inspection, then reason must condemn this as complacency. (Gouldner, 1968, p. 121)

A deeper analysis of self-realization shows plainly that the self people aim to realize is "not this or that feeling, or any series of particular feelings" (Bradley, 1876/1952, p. 160); people realize themselves morally:
So that not only what ought to be is in the world, but I am what I ought to be, and so find my contentment and satisfaction. (Bradley, 1876/1952, p. 191)

The self has a peculiar place in teaching as a form of moral action; it is at once subdued and vital as a source of courage, spirit, kindliness.

**Profession Requires Community**

What is characteristically moral presupposes community, both on conceptual and pragmatic grounds. The concept of community is logically prior to the concept of role. The very possibility of the pursuit of an ideal form of life requires membership in a moral community; it is extremely unlikely that minimal social conditions for the pursuit of any ideal people are likely to entertain would in practice be fulfilled except through membership in such communities (Strawson, 1974; Schwab, 1976a; for an excellent review of empirical literature relevant to this topic, see Purkey & Smith, 1983). Membership in moral communities is realized in action, conversation, and reflection. As a moral community, a profession

is composed of people who think they are professionals and who seek, through the practical inquiry of their lives, both alone and together, to clarify and live up to what they mean by being a professional. (Thelen, 1973, pp. 200-201; emphasis in original work)

The quality of aspiration--of aiming steadfastly for an ideal--is supported by the normative expectations of others. Individual and collective learning in the teaching profession depend, in particular, on norms of collegiality and experimentation.

Norms of collegiality and experimentation are moral demands with intellectual substance. They are not matters of individual preference but based, instead, on a shared understanding of the kinds of behaviors and dispositions that people have a right to expect of teachers (Little, 1981).
These norms require detachment—a willingness to stand back from personal habits, interests, and opinions. What one does or believes in is not talked about as part of one’s self but as something other—it becomes a potential exemplar of good (or not so good) ways of working, or of more or less justified beliefs. In teaching, what people do is neither private nor sacred but open to judgments of worth and relevance in the light of professional obligation.

Community provides not only constraints and guidance but succor. Collegiality, however, also depends on the degree to which another person is deserving and one’s equal in deserts; it is not just loyalty and mutual help, but the enjoyment of competence in other people. Essential to collegiality in teaching is the degree to which its practitioners are good at talking with one another about their work and can be confident about their own ability, and that of others’, as teachers and partners in the improvement of teaching. Without mental, social, and role competence, norms of collegiality and experimentation cannot take hold. There are some uncomfortable questions that need to be confronted here:

What effect does the relative exclusion of ordinary teachers from the wider governance of education, their restricted access to educational theory and other kinds of school practice, and the consequent overwhelming centrality of classroom practicalities to teachers, have on the kinds of contributions they make to staff discussion? (Hargreaves, 1982, pp. 263-264, emphasis in the original)

Morality and Authenticity in Teaching

Of course, teachers are persons. But being one’s self in teaching is not enough. Authenticity must be paired with legitimacy as opposed to impulse and inflexible habit, and with productivity or a reasoned sense of purpose and consequences (Thelen, 1973). Thelen places authenticity in the context of
action (authentic activities makes teachers feel alive and challenged) and gives legitimacy and productivity the accent of thought:

An activity is legitimated by reason, as distinguished from capricious—seeming teacher demand, acting out impulse, mere availability, or impenetrable habit. An activity may be legitimated by group purposes, disciplines of knowledge, career demands, test objectives, requirements, societal issues, laws, or by any other larger, organized context that enables the activity to go beyond its own particulars. . . .

An activity is productive to the extent that it is effective for some purpose. . . . It is awareness of purpose that makes means-ends thinking possible, allows consciousness and self-direction, tests self-concepts against reality, and makes practice add up to capability. (p. 213)

Legitimacy and productivity are entwined, capturing social expectations and aspirations central to teaching and to learning from teaching. People's ordinary conception of morality describes this interplay between ideals and the rule requirements of social organizations (Strawson, 1974).

To the extent that roles have moral content, their impersonality is not inhuman or uninspired. But rules, norms, and external standards alone cannot account for moral action in teaching. First, role orientation must be lodged concretely in someone's head and heart; where one's solid and full response to obligations is withheld, the claims of others are not acknowledged livingly (James, 1969). As Dewey (1933/1971) stressed, thoughtful action does not only depend on open-mindedness and responsibility, wholeheartedness is also part of it. To the extent, then, that the content of role has been absorbed into the self, role becomes a personal project—shaping the inner self and the self as it appears to others. Thus moral aspirations cannot be separated from the question of personal identity, but conversely, responsibility for oneself, as a person, does not mean that anything goes (Taylor, 1970).
Second, the moral quality of role relations between professionals and clients draws on loyalty to concrete persons and analogues to friendship in enacting role (Fried, 1978). The warmth and selectivity of feeling implied by this contradicts the impersonality of role. Loyalty as abstract duty is not the same as actually taking faithful care of the particular people put into one's charge. All this is complicated by the fact that, in teaching, professionals face groups of young clients, not in school by choice. The role of the classroom teacher, therefore,

puts the major obligations for effective action on his shoulders; it is the teacher's responsibility to coordinate, stimulate, and shepherd the immature workers in his charge. . . . Task and expressive leadership in classrooms must emanate from the teacher, who, it is presumed, corrects for the capriciousness of students with the steadiness, resolve, and sangfroid of one who governs. The austere virtues, moreover, must be complemented by warmer qualities like empathy and patience. It becomes clear, then, that the self of the teacher, his very personality, is deeply engaged in classroom work; the self must be used and disciplined as a tool necessary for achieving results and earning work gratifications. (Lortie, 1975, pp. 155-156; see also Waller, 1932/1961, pp. 385-386)

In sum, the moral nature of teaching—which also requires being genuinely oneself—does not remove the need for role orientation. Instead, a proper understanding of authenticity in teaching builds in the idea of external standards within which teachers make authentic choices. The need for authenticity hence supplies no argument against role orientation, but suggests that there are some teacher decisions that will be completely determined by role, some that are constrained by role but not determined, and some—not many—for which role does not and should not provide guidance.
References


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